The Caravan

The Caravan

While listening to news radio this week I heard about a proposal to change the law in relation to living in a caravan on your own land. Living in caravans (or anything for that matter) is, of course, topical because of the housing crisis.

Caravans – the current law

We all know that we need development consent to erect any building on land. A building is defined in the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 (“the EP&A Act”). A building: “includes part of a building and any structure or part of a structure, but does not include: (a) a manufactured home, a moveable dwelling or associated structure or part of a manufactured home, a moveable dwelling or associated structure”.

Also, regulation 77(b) of Local Government (Manufactured Home Estates, Caravan Parks, Camping Grounds and Moveable Dwellings) Regulation 2005 makes it clear that: Council approval is not required for: (b) “the installation of not more than one caravan or campervan on land occupied by the owner of the caravan or campervan in connection with that owner’s dwelling-house, so long as it is used for habitation only by the owner or by members of the owner’s household and is maintained in a safe and healthy condition”.

Caravan is a defined term which means “a moveable dwelling that is designed so as to be capable of being registered (within the meaning of the Road Transport Act 2013) as a trailer, but does not include a camper trailer“.

Mr Findlay’s Caravan

Mr Findlay was living a peaceful existence in his caravan on his property at Bexley. That all came to an end when Rockdale Council started proceedings against him and sought declarations that he had carried out development without consent. Why? Well, although he was living in his caravan on his land, it turns out that the caravan (with annex) was on top of a shipping container that was also on his land. The case (Rockdale City Council v Findlay [2004] NSWLEC 592) pre-dates regulation 77 referred to above and the argument was all about whether the caravan in its current mezzanine position was still a “moveable dwelling”. It wasn’t.  To add insult to injury, there is also authority for the proposition that the container was itself, a structure which required consent (see Wyong Shire Council v Cohen & Anor [2004] NSWLEC 171).

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Declared Vexatious #2

Declared Vexatious #2

There have been some stand out examples of vexatious litigants over the years. You may remember Mr Wilson (the trial by jury guy) or Mr Skyring (the currency guy)My interest was recently piqued when I read an article about an ACT solicitor who was recently declared vexatious.

It all started innocently enough, when, after 5 years of supervised practice, the solicitor decided he wanted to go out on his own.  His initial application for an unrestricted practising certificate in August 2008 was declined on the basis that he hadn’t completed the practice management course. It appears he had enrolled in, but didn’t satisfactorily complete the July-August 2008 course. Eventually all the requirements were met and he was granted his unrestricted certificate on 1 July 2009. This was a few months later than he had hoped for. Instead of just getting on with business, he decided to sue the ACT Law Society for the damages incurred by that delay.

Anyway, almost 15 years and 37 (not a typo) sets of proceedings later, he was declared a vexatious litigant by Acting Justice Curtin (see Ezekiel-Hart v The Council of the Law Society of the ACT (No 7) [2024] ACTSC 12). Apart from the appalling facts, the judgment is a very useful summary of the law in relation to vexatious litigants.

It is also an opportune time to explore some of the highlights from the journey.

The Second Proceeding

 

It was perhaps a sign of things to come when Gray J (in proceedings #2 which were an appeal against the summary dismissal of proceedings #1) observed:

[5] That general pleading sets the tenor for a series of allegations of causing loss to the Commonwealth, discriminatory marking of the plaintiff’s script, discrimination against the plaintiff’s children and wrongful activities with respect to the ACT Vice Presidential Election, amongst other matters.

[6] The pleadings are in a form which readily lend themselves to a description of proceedings that would tend to prejudice or embarrass the fair trial of whatever cause of action might be the subject of them.  I must say, on my reading of the pleadings, there is certainly no clearly discernible cause of action on which the claim for damages is based.  The drawing of the pleadings in the form that they are presented, in my view, do not reflect at all well on Mr Ezekiel-Hart’s holding of an unrestricted practising certificate.

The Twenty Third Proceeding

 

Apparently, his drafting skills hadn’t improved by proceedings #23 when Kennett J struck out the plaintiff’s further amended statement of claim and dismissed the proceeding (see Ezekiel-Hart v Council of the Law Society of the ACT (No 3) [2022] ACTSC 300 at [86]). His Honour described the further amended statement of claim as follows:

[22]  The FASC is a daunting document. It contains 239 numbered paragraphs spread over 99 pages, followed by 21 paragraphs purporting to identify the relief sought. Further, those figures give only a hint of its complexity. Paragraph 15 contains 323 sub-paragraphs, purporting to be “particulars” (but not purporting to be exhaustive), which are repeated for the purposes of several of the paragraphs that follow. Paragraph 239 then repeats (to what purpose I am yet to understand) paragraphs 14 to 240, although there is no paragraph 240.

[23]  More significantly, the FASC presents as a document drafted and settled by a person who has at best a tenuous grasp of legal principle and principles of pleading, and who has such strong opinions about the subject matter as to be incapable of any degree of detachment. It is convoluted, repetitive and conclusory. etc etc [ouch!]

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Burial in space

Burial in space

You may have noticed that for the first time in around 10 years of writing this blog, that there haven’t been any posts for a couple of months. There were lots of things happening late last year, including the winding up of my old chambers and the move to new ones at Queen’s Square. Unfortunately blogging became a lower priority for a short time. However, 2024 is a new year and an opportunity for a fresh start.

However, those circumstances and a recent article I read in The Conversation gave me the idea for this post. You may remember the intricacies of being buried at sea? If that is not adventurous enough for you, perhaps you should consider a “burial” in space or even on the moon? One of the controversies surrounding NASA’s recent failed Peregrine moon (non-) lander  was that amongst it’s payload were the ashes of Arthur C Clarke (the scifi writer). This sparked protests from the Navajo people who believe the moon to be sacred and oppose its use as a memorial site. There are numerous other issues to consider:

no-one owns the moon (and no-one has authority to grant burial rights);
there is an Outer Space Treaty which makes space the “province of all mankind”. Of course, the treaty doesn’t deal with what commercial operators can do;
domestic law could make things difficult. Apparently it is the law in Germany that ashes have to be buried in a cemetery; and
in Australia and NZ, there is law which refuses space payloads that are not in their national interest. Hmmmm – ashes?

Notwithstanding all of the above, the US company Celestis offers a number of memorial spaceflight services for you or a loved one. For US$2995 your ashes can be launched to space and returned to earth. For US$12,995 your ashes or DNA could be launched to lunar orbit (or the surface of the moon) or sent into deep space. My personal preference is to carry “the cremated remains or DNA into orbit where it remains until it re-enters the atmosphere, harmlessly vaporizing like a shooting star in final tribute“. This service is from US$4,995 and of course there is an app where you track the progress of the mission. 

Welcome to 2024.

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Courteous correspondence

Courteous correspondence

Courteous correspondence (or lack of it) has been the subject of posts to this blog several times in the past. This week I think I have found the low point. A solicitor in the NT was fined $770 (7 penalty units) for this letter to a client:

Do not call me as your call would most certainly not be welcome … you are the most paranoid, pathetic client I have ever encountered … I suggest you get a life as I now understand why the offender in your matter would have felt compelled to slot you. … I otherwise confirm the settlement amount exceeded your expectations … for which you have expressed all the gratitude of a mangy dog with the heart the size of a split pea, with grub in it.”

I have found a number of references to this quote in ethics papers given by judicial officers and legal services commissioners. None of them give a citation and the matter must pre-date 2006. Those papers sadly also often reference the 1937 quote from US novelist Thomas Wolfe: “The more I have to deal with lawyers, the more I feel as if I have been compelled to take a voyage down a sewer in a glass bottom boat”.

Why do people do this? Conduct rule 4.1.2  to be honest and courteous in all dealings (not just correspondence) in the course of legal practice is not that hard to comply with! 

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The Other Judge Vasta

The Other Judge Vasta

Judge Salvatore Vasta’s decision to imprison Mr Stradford (a pseudonym)  for contempt of the former Federal Circuit Court in 2018 was promptly reversed by the Full Family Court. The Full Court had described the process to be “so devoid of procedural fairness that to allow the order for imprisonment to stand would be an affront to justice” (see Stradford & Stradford (2019) FLC 93-888).

The damages case

The case has recently become newsworthy again with Mr Stradford’s claim for damages against Judge Vasta being successful. In an 852 paragraph judgment, Wigney J in the Federal Court traversed some rarely seen issues including judicial immunity and whether it applies to inferior court judges. The end result is that the Judge will be personally liable for a portion of the damages. If you’re not up to reading the judgment you could just listen to the Law Report podcast.

Angelo Vasta

However, this post is not about Judge Vasta Jr.  I grew up in Bjelke-Peterson pre-Fitzgerald Queensland and even I remember the controversy surrounding his father, former justice of the Supreme Court of QLD, Angelo Vasta.

On 8 June 1989, Mr Angelo Vasta QC’s commission as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland was cancelled by the then Governor of Queensland, the late Sir Walter Campbell AC QC. The action taken by the Governor followed a motion of the Queensland Parliament passed the day before to remove Mr Vasta from the Supreme Court due to behaviour which in the opinion of a Parliamentary Judges Commission of Inquiry  warranted his removal from office.

Needless to say there was a tangled web of matters that ultimately led to his removal. He is (I think) the only Supreme Court Judge who has ever been removed from office. The matters started with a defamation case against the magazine Matilda, which published material about his relationship with the then police commissioner Terry Lewis. Of course, friendship with Terry Lewis resulted in him being invited to give evidence in the Fitzgerald Enquiry. That invitation was declined and Justice Vasta was then given notice that there may have been evidence that an affidavit he swore in the defamation proceedings may not have been entirely correct.

This is quite a long saga and most of it is difficult to find on the internet. However, in 2017 Robbie Katter (state member for Mt Isa and Bob’s son) introduced a private member’s bill to the QLD parliament. A parliamentary committee  examined the Honourable Angelo Vasta (Reversal of Removal) Bill 2017  and recommended that it not be passed (which it wasn’t). The detail of the history and background are set out in the report of that committee which is on the internet.

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Bell Group Winding Up Terminated

Bell Group Winding Up Terminated

The Bell Group litigation was the subject of my first ever post to this blog back in June 2009.

In September 2020, it was up to Master Sanderson to make orders terminating the winding up. I have set out the whole judgment in full below. It’s not very long. If you are really impatient skip straight to paragraphs 7-8. Alternatively, you can find it at 2020  WASC 347.

 

These reasons are not so much a judgment as a requiem.

 

This was an application to terminate the winding up by Bell Group (UK) Holdings Ltd (In liq) (the company) of Western Interstate Pty Ltd.  This was one of a group of companies around which what is known as the ‘Bell litigation’ swirled for 25 years.

 

Thousands of people worked on this case.  Most have put the experience behind them and moved on; many, shattered by the experience, have retired; more than a few have gone mad.  Now the guns have fallen silent.  The smell of cordite, gun powder and napalm no longer fills the air.  The dead and wounded have been removed from the battle field.  The victors have divided the spoils and departed.

 

The trial involving this company, and others, lasted for 404 days between July 2003 and September 2006.  The judgment took two years and ran to 2,643 pages.  The trial judge was Justice Neville Owen.  No Australian judge before or since could have handled the case better than his Honour.  Anyone who dips into the judgment – and I do not for a moment suggest anyone should read it in its entirety – will be struck by the detailed consideration of the evidence, the careful balancing of the issues and the clear exposition of a difficult area of the law.

 

The defendants in the action were a group of banks.  At first instance they were held liable.  They appealed.  Not only did they lose the appeal, they lost the cross‑appeal and the amount of damages was increased.  The banks made an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.  Astonishingly, they were successful.  At this point even the bare‑knuckled litigators were exhausted.  The action was settled.  More than a billion dollars was to be divided between the plaintiffs. 

 

The plaintiffs then set to squabbling among themselves.  For years they had an uneasy relationship with one another but were united against a common foe.  Now the prospect of vast riches proved too much.  The relationship rapidly became poisonous.  Years passed and no resolution proved possible.  The battle lines were drawn.  The State government attempted to resolve the matter by effectively confiscating the proceeds of the case and paying to each of the parties what they deemed to be a fair entitlement.  This strategy failed spectacularly – the legislation was struck down by the High Court.  At a directions hearing, not long after the High Court decision, I was told by counsel they anticipated the trial of the issues between the plaintiffs would take longer to hear than the original case.  A date was set for trial.  Then someone blinked.  Further negotiations took place.  Mercifully, the matter settled.

 

Over the years, I dealt with the case on more than a dozen occasions.  Most of these hearings were for judicial directions.  It was clear there existed between counsel a mutual loathing.  That was probably due to frustration – not only frustration with the glacial progress of the case, but frustration with the clients.  Occasionally, agreement was reached – the time of the day, the day of the week – but agreement was otherwise rare.  Invariably, the liquidator was represented by Vaughan SC (as his Honour then was).  There were times when I thought even his sphinx‑like visage would crack.  But somehow, the matter edged forward.  Now it is settled and it remained for me to give this, and other companies in the group, a decent burial.

 

It was tempting to drive a wooden stake through the heart of the company to ensure it does not rise zombie‑like from the grave.  As an alternative, I considered ordering the files be removed to a secure facility in Roswell and marked: ‘Never to be opened’.  In the end, trusting in divine providence, I made the following orders:

1. The applicant have leave to discontinue the winding up application.

2. The applicant’s winding up application is hereby dismissed.

3. There be no orders as to costs as to the winding up application.

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